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Abstract. We study the role of strategy correlations and timing of adaptation for the dynamics of Minority
Games, both simulationally and analytically. Using the exact generating functional approach a` la De
Dominicis we compute the phase diagram and the behaviour of batch and on-line games with correlated
strategies, complementing exisiting replica studies of their statics. It is shown that the timing of adaptation
can be relevant; while conventional games with uncorrelated strategies are nearly insensitive to the choice
of on-line versus batch learning, we find qualitative differences when anti-correlations are present in the
strategy assignments. The available standard approximations for the volatility in terms of persistent order
parameters in the stationary ergodic states become unreliable in batch games under such circumstances.
We then comment on the role of oscillations and the relation to the breakdown of ergodicity. Finally, it
is discussed how the generating functional formalism can be used to study mixed populations of so-called
‘producers’ and ‘speculators’ in the context of the batch minority games.
PACS. 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
1 Introduction
The collective behaviour of interacting heterogeneous and
adaptive agents has attracted a substantial amount of at-
tention in the statistical physics communtity in recent
years. The general aim is to understand how complex
macroscopic co-operation can emerge from the underlying
microscopic laws that govern the behaviour of the individ-
ual agents. The minority game (MG) [1] is probably one
of the most studied models in this context. It describes an
ensemble of traders who at each time step receive a piece
of public information and react by either buying or selling.
Learning from past experience, the aim of the individual
agent is to be in the minority at each round of the game,
i.e. to buy when most of the traders are selling and vice
versa. To take their trading decisions the agents employ
strategies assigned randomly at the start of the game and
then kept fixed. These effectively act as look-up tables pro-
viding a map from the observed public information onto
a binary trading decision. At each time step the individ-
ual agent employs the strategy in his or her pool he or
she believes will maximise their potential payoff. In order
to measure the performance of their strategies they allo-
cate virtual points to each of their strategies, increasing
the score of strategies that would have yielded a correct
minority decision.
Thanks to the simplicity of the microscopic equations
of motion and because of analogies to models of spin-
glasses and neural networks, analytical progress can be
made using both static and dynamical methods of sta-
tistical mechanics. It has been found that the relevant
control parameter for MGs is the ratio α = P/N of the
number P of possible values for the external information
over the number of players N . A phase transition between
an ergodic phase at high α and non-ergodic states be-
low a critical value αc has been identified and analytical
expressions for the macroscopic order parameters charac-
terising the different states have been obtained [2,3,4,5,
6,7]. While some order parameters in the ergodic phase
can be computed in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞
without making any approximations, the dynamics of the
game in its non-ergodic phase at low values of α is not yet
fully understood. Furthermore the calculation of a key ob-
servable of the MG, the magnitude of the overall market
fluctuations or so-called volatility, is up to now restriced
to approximations both in dynamical approaches and in
static replica analyses [6,3].
In the original setup of the MG the strategies assigned
to a given agent were completely uncorrelated and the
information fed to the agents was based on the real his-
tory of the market dynamics [1,8]. Also, updates of the
virtual scores of the agents’ strategies were performed
after each round of the game, and their relative success
re-assessed before each trading decision, i.e. agents could
switch strategies between any two successive rounds of
the game. Such variants of the MG with score updates at
every round of the game are generally referred to as ‘on-
line’ games. It was realised that no qualitative changes
in the overall behaviour occured when the stream of in-
formation was replaced by random inputs at each time
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step [9]. Hereafter we shall therefore distinguish between
on-line games with ‘real’ or ‘random’ market history, re-
spectively. It is technically much easier to deal with the
case of ‘random’ history so henceforth we concentrate on
this version (see however the recent work [10] for a gener-
ating functional analysis of MGs with real market histo-
ries). Early studies showed only slight differences between
on-line MGs with uncorrelated strategies and correspond-
ing games in which the agents effectively sample a large
set of information patterns before updating the scores of
their strategies. This amounts to replacing the inflowing
information by an averaging procedure over all possible
values of the pieces of information to yield an effective
interaction between the agents; such models are known
as ‘batch’ minority games. On the technical level, using
this effective interaction, the dynamics of batch MGs are
much easier to study than their on-line counterparts, and
hence most current dynamical studies are concerned with
batch versions of the MG [6,11,12,13,14,15]. Also, here
we restrict ourselves to the case of deterministic decision
making; a stochastic extension is straightforward to con-
sider [16], but complicates the detailed mathematics of the
analysis. Reviews on the MG can be found in [17,18]; note
also the recently published textbooks [19,20].
In this paper we extend the generating functional anal-
ysis of batch and on-line games with uncorrelated strate-
gies as presented in [6,21] to the case of correlated and
anti-correlated strategies. The purpose is twofold, firstly
we provide an analysis of the dynamics of such MGs with
so-called ‘diversified’ strategies and complement the study
of their statics previously presented by other authors in
[2]. Secondly, we find that in the presence of anti-correlated
strategies significant differences in the global behaviour of
batch and on-line MGs are present, i.e. that the the overall
performance of the system strongly depends on the timing
of adapation of the agents. This effect is small in the case
of conventional MGs with uncorrelated strategies, but be-
comes magnified as the degree of anti-correlation in the
strategy assignments is increased. We also demonstrate
that some approximations which reproduce the the volatil-
ity of batch MGs with uncorrelated strategies with good
accuracy, and are hence often considered to be standard,
become inaccurate in games with highly anti-correlated
stategies. We then discuss the effects of strategy corre-
lations on the sensitivity to initial conditions and com-
ment on the relation between the global oscillations and
the breakdown of ergodicity in batch and on-line MG with
different strategy correlations. As a by-product of the gen-
erating functional analysis of the dynamics of games with
general distributions of correlation parameters we finally
study the case of bi-modal distributions, corresponding to
a mixed population of so-called ‘speculators’ and ‘produc-
ers’
2 Model Definitions
The MG describes the decision making dynamics of N
interacting agents, i = 1, . . . , N . At each round ℓ of the
game all agents are given the same external information
I(ℓ) taken from a set of P elements. They utilise this in-
formation to determine an action by choosing from one of
a personal set of S strategies whose operation on the in-
formation yields a decision. Simulations have shown that
restriction to S = 2 strategies per agent yields characteris-
tic behaviour. It also simplifies the analysis. Hence we re-
strict the further discussion here to this case. We also sim-
plify the choices of the space of information and character
of the decisions. Hence here we take each agent to hold
two P -dimensional strategy vectors Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
P
ia),
a = ±1, with each component Rµia chosen randomly from
the set {−1, 1} at the beginning of the game and there-
after fixed and the information to be given by an integer
µ(ℓ) chosen randomly and independently at each step ℓ
from the set {1, . . . , P = αN}. Then the strategies act
as look up tables for deciding ‘trading’ action, yielding
output R
µ(ℓ)
ia . If player i decides to use strategy a
∗
i (ℓ) at
round ℓ of the game his or her trading action will be
bi(t) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia∗
i
(ℓ). The re-scaled total bid at stage ℓ is then
defined as A(ℓ) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(ℓ). In order to decide which
of their two strategies to use at any given time each play-
ers keeps a record of the relative performance of his or
her strategies. A payoff value pia(ℓ) is assigned to each
strategy and updated every M time steps according to
pia(ℓ+M) = pia(ℓ)− Γ√
N
ℓ+M−1∑
ℓ′=ℓ
R
µ(ℓ′)
ia A(ℓ
′). (1)
In between the updates the scores pia are kept constant.
Γ > 0 is a learning rate and of order O(N0), introduced
for convenience [21]. Note that the minus sign in the up-
date prescription ensures that strategies which predict
correct minority decisions are rewarded. At each round
player i then plays the strategy in his or her arsenal with
the highest relative score, i.e. a∗i (ℓ) = sgn[qi(ℓ)], where
qi(ℓ) =
1
2 (pi,1(ℓ)−pi,−1(ℓ)) is the point difference of player
i’s strategies at time ℓ. Upon introduction of ωi = (Ri,1+
Ri,−1)/2 and ξi = (Ri,1 −Ri,−1)/2 the update rule (1)
can be compactified to
qi(ℓ +M) = qi(ℓ)− Γ√
N
ℓ+M−1∑
ℓ′=ℓ
ξ
µ(ℓ′)
i
×
{
N−1/2
∑
j
(
ω
µ(ℓ′)
j + ξ
µ(ℓ′)
j sj(ℓ
′)
)}
. (2)
Here we have introduced the shorthand notation si(ℓ) =
sgn[qi(ℓ)], we will also abbreviate Ω = N
−1/2∑
j ωj . The
case M = 1 (where strategy scores are updated at ev-
ery time step) is referred to as the on-line model. For
M ≥ O(αN) one expects (and simulations confirm) the
behaviour of the system to be the same as that for the
so-called batch version in which the sum over the ac-
tual values µ(ℓ′) is replaced by an average over the set
µ ∈ {1, . . . , αN}:
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− Γ
N
αN∑
µ=1
ξµi
{∑
j
(
ωµj + ξ
µ
j sj(t)
) }
. (3)
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Note that an appropriate re-scaling of time is implied,
as one batch time step corresponds to O(αN) on-line
steps. Introducting the notation Jij = Γξi · ξj/N and
hi = Γξi ·Ω/
√
N the batch update rule (3) can be writ-
ten compactly as
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− hi −
∑
j
Jijsj(t). (4)
In the original game the strategies are chosen without
correlations between the agents and also independently
within the set of strategies of a fixed agent i, i.e. one has
RµiaR
ν
jb = δijδabδµν , (5)
where · · · denotes an average over the disorder, i.e. over the
space of strategy assignments. In this paper, we will con-
sider cases of correlated strategy vectors Ri,−1 and Ri,1
of a fixed agent i. Specifically we generalize the standard
case to a situation in which Rµi1 = R
µ
i2 with probability
ρi ∈ [0, 1] for any given i and µ (and Rµi1 6= Rµi2 with
probability 1− ρi, recall that the Rµia take only values −1
and 1). The joint probability distribution of Rµi1 and R
µ
i2
is then given by
P (Rµi1 = x,R
µ
i2 = y) =
ρi
2
(δx,−1δy,−1 + δx,1δy,1)
+
1− ρi
2
(δx,−1δy,1 + δx,1δy,−1) . (6)
The standard situation of independent strategies is cov-
ered as the special case ρi = 1/2 for all players i. On the
other hand, if ρi = 1, then player i holds two identical
strategy vectors, whereas for ρi = 0 he or she has two
opposite strategies, Ri,−1 = −Ri,1. Allowing the corre-
lation parameter ρi to depend on i adds another layer of
heterogeneity to the ensemble of agents: not only are their
strategies chosen at random and hence are heterogeneous
across the group of N players, but also the probability
distribution from which they are drawn may be different
for different agents. We will assume that each ρi is ran-
domly and independently drawn from a distribution P (ρ),
so that, for example, P (ρ) = δ(ρ−1/2) corresponds to the
standard game, with ρi = 1/2 for all i. Some of our results
presented below have been summarized in the short paper
[22]. The statics of MGs with correlated strategies were
first studied using replica methods in [2]. Numerical re-
sults are also found in [23], and in [24], where an effective
correlation between the assigned strategies was introduced
upon biasing the {Rµia} towards one of the binary entries.
Let us finally, in this section, introduce the volatility,
σ2, of the market. It describes the variance of the total re-
scaled market bid A, and can be defined as the following
long-time average:
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
ℓ≤τ
A(ℓ)2. (7)
In on-line models the relevant average over the stochastic-
ity of the information is to be performed, as A(ℓ) depends
on both the score valuations {qi(ℓ)} and the value of the
external information µ(ℓ). In deterministic batch games
this average is replaced by one over µ
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
t≤τ
P−1
P∑
µ=1
(Aµ(t))2, (8)
where Aµ(t) = Ωµ+N−1/2
∑
j ξ
µ
j sj(t). The volatility is a
measure for the global efficiency of the market; if σ2 = 0
supply and demand are always matched (A = 0) and trad-
ing is fully efficient. Non-zero volatilities however indicate
mismatches between the numbers of buyers and sellers,
and hence imply inefficient markets. For the mathemati-
cal analysis of batch MGs it is also convenient to introduce
the volatility matrix Ξ [6]
Ξtt′ = P
−1
P∑
µ=1
Aµ(t)Aµ(t′). (9)
Note that σ2 = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ Ξtt, and that stochas-
tic trading with si(t) = ±1 taken randomly and indepen-
dently at any time step t would result in Ξtt′ =
1
2 (1+ δtt′)
in the thermodynamic limit. In particular σ2 = 1 is the
so-called random trading limit.
3 Generating functional and effective
single-agent process for the batch game
We will now turn to the generating functional analysis of
the batch process (3). The calculation is an extension of
the analysis of the standard game presented in [6].
3.1 Generating functional and disorder average
The moment generating functional corresponding to the
batch process of Eq. (3) reads
Z[ψ] =
∫
dq p0(q(0)) exp
(
i
∑
it
ψi(t)si(t)
)
∏
it
δ
qi(t+ 1)− qi(t) +∑
j
Jijsj(t) + hi − θi(t)
 ,(10)
where we have introduced the usual source term contain-
ing the field variables {ψi(t)}. The {θi(t)} are additional
perturbation fields, introduced to generate response func-
tions, and p0(q(0)) denotes the probability distribution of
the initial score differences q(0) = (q1(0), . . . , qN (0)) from
which the dynamics is started.
The further analysis is standard and follows the lines
of [6]. The average over the strategy assignments can be
performed exactly in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞,
leading to a (quenched-strategy-) disorder averaged gen-
erating functional Z[ψ], from which all dynamical observ-
ables can be computed upon taking derivatives with re-
spect to the {ψi(t)} and {θi(t)}, finally taking the limit
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in which these generating fields go to zero. The relevant
macroscopic order parameters of the resulting theory are
the weighted disorder-averaged correlation and response
functions of the original N -particle problem:
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
1− ρi
1− ρ 〈si(t)si(t
′)〉, (11)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
1− ρi
1− ρ
∂〈si(t)〉
∂θi(t′)
, (12)
where 〈. . .〉 denotes an average over initial conditions (as
specified by the distribution p0(q(0)). We use the notation
ρ =
∫
dρP (ρ)ρ for the first moment of the distribution
P (ρ) of correlation parameters1. While the numerator in
the unusual pre-factors (1 − ρi)/(1− ρ) is a direct conse-
quence of the averaging procedure over the assignments of
correlated strategies, the denominator is chosen to ensure
that the equal time correlation function is equal to one,
Ctt = 1
2. For later convenience we shall take the inverse
characteristic time-scale Γ in the couplings Jij and the
fields hi to be given by Γ = 1/(1− ρ).
In an extention of the procedure for uncorrelated agents,
by introducing auxiliary macroscopic functions relateable
to the correlation and response functions, performing sum-
mations over the microscopic variables and utilising ex-
tremal dominance in the limit N → ∞, the computation
results in an equivalence of the original Markovian coupled
N -particle dynamics to an ensemble of non-Markovian sin-
gle agent problems, explicitly involving the correlation and
response functions C andG and subject to self-consistently
determined coloured noise.
Explicitly, the equivalence is to an ensemble of effec-
tive single agents with characteristic labels ρ subject to
stochastic dynamics
qρ(t+ 1) = qρ(t) + θρ(t)− 1− ρ
1− ρα
∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)−1tt′ sρ(t
′)
+
√
α
1 − ρ
1 − ρηρ(t); sρ(t) = sgn[qρ(t)] (13)
with fractional population P (ρ) and with {ηρ(t)}Gaussian
coloured noise of zero average and covariance
Λtt′ ≡ 〈ηρ(t)ηρ(t′)〉ηρ = [(1I+G)−1D(1I+GT )−1]tt′ , (14)
where 1Itt′ = δtt′ and C, G and D (Dtt′ =
ρ
1−ρ + Ctt′ for
all t, t′) are determined self-consistently across the ensem-
ble3. In the derivation of (13) we have assumed that the
1 Note that the overbar on ρ has a different meaning from
the other overbars, which indicate averaging over the quenched
disorder choices.
2 We assume here that ρ < 1, and exclude the case ρ = 1.
The latter case corresponds to a situation in which all agents
(except for a non-extensive number) have ρi = 1, and hence
hold two identical strategies. Such a game trivially leads to a
volatility σ2 = 1, corresponding to the random trading limit,
and exhibits no phase transition.
3 A similar situation involving an ensemble of single agent
processes has been encountered in [13], where the author dis-
cusses a population of agents trading with different frequencies.
perturbation fields θi(t) for players i with correlation pa-
rameter ρi = ρ are all identical, θi(t) = θρ(t), and that the
initial values qi(0) for agents i ∈ {j = 1, . . . , N |ρj = ρ} in
the original N -particle dynamics are all drawn indepen-
dently from the same distribution p0ρ(qi(0)), i.e. that the
distribution of initial values factorizes over agents with
the same correlation parameter ρ.
Note that the different single particle noises {ηρ} (for
different values of ρ) all have the same covariance matrix
Λtt′ , with no explicit dependence on ρ, but only an implicit
one on the distribution P (ρ) through the correlation and
response matrices C and G. Nevertheless we will keep the
subscript ρ in ηρ to distinguish the noise contributions to
the effective single-agent processes for different values of
ρ. The correlation and response functions Ctt′ and Gtt′ are
then to be computed self-consistently as two-fold averages
over (i) the measure 〈. . . |ρ〉∗ generated by the realizations
of the process {qρ(t)}:
< f [qρ]|ρ >∗ =
∫
DqρDqˆρp0(qρ(0))f [qρ]
× exp
(
i
∑
t
qˆρ(t)(qρ(t+ 1)− qρ(t)− θρ(t))
)
× exp
(
iα
1− ρ
1− ρ
∑
tt′
qˆρ(t)(1I +G)
−1
tt′ sρ(t
′)
−1
2
α
1 − ρ
1 − ρ
∑
tt′
qˆρ(t)[(1I +G)
−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt′ qˆρ(t′)
)
,
(15)
and (ii) over the distribution P (ρ) of correlation parame-
ters. In detail one has
Ctt′ =
∫
dρP (ρ)
1 − ρ
1 − ρ < sρ(t)sρ(t
′)|ρ >∗
≡
∫
dρP (ρ)
1 − ρ
1 − ρCρ(t, t
′), (16)
Gtt′ =
∫
dρP (ρ)
1 − ρ
1 − ρ
∂
∂θρ(t′)
< sρ(t)|ρ >∗
≡
∫
dρP (ρ)
1 − ρ
1 − ρGρ(t, t
′), (17)
so that the different processes (13) (with different values
of ρ) are effectively coupled through the matrices C and
G, which appear in (13) and in the noise correlator (14)
and which at the same time are (weighted) averages over
the whole ensemble of representative agent processes. The
original N -agent dynamics and the self-consistent single
agent problem are equivalent in the thermodynamic limit
in the sense that disorder-averaged observables in the orig-
inal problem (such as the correlation and response func-
tions (11, 12)) are identical to the corresponding aver-
ages obtained from the ensemble of effective single-agent
processes (Eqs. (16, 17) for the correlation and response
functions). This equivalence extends to other macroscopic
observables, including the probability for a given agent to
‘freeze’ (i.e. to use only one of his or her two strategies) in
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the long-run. We will use the resulting ‘fraction of frozen’
agents below in the further analysis of the effective agent
dynamics.
Due to the presence of the coloured noise {ηρ(t)} and
the retarded self-interaction term in Eq. (13) a direct so-
lution of the self-consistent problem defined by (13-17) is
in general impossible beyond the first few time steps. An
analysis of possible ergodic time-translation invariant sta-
tionary states is however feasible, and will be presented be-
low. Alternatively one can resort to a numerical iteration
of the representative agent problem using a method first
proposed in [25]. This effective Monte-Carlo integration
of the single agent problem allows one to determine the
correlation and response matrices C and G to arbitrary
precision without finite-size effects, but becomes more and
more costly computationally as the number of time steps t
is increased (due to required inversions of matrices of size
t× t at time step t).
This direct-iteration procedure does not require any
further assumptions on the properties of the dynamical
order parameters, and can be carried out for all values of
α in both the ergodic and non-ergodic regimes of the game.
In Fig. 1 we display results for the volatility as a function
of α for unimodal distributions of the correlation param-
eter, ρi = ρ for all i. We find good agreement between
the data obtained from a direct simulation of the batch
process (open symbols in Fig. 1) and from an iteration of
the effective single-agent process (solid markers), respec-
tively. This confirms the validity of the analytical theory
derived in this section for general P (ρ) in the special case
of unimodal distributions of strategy correlations.
We will now proceed to analyse the single-effective
agent process further and to compute persistent order pa-
rameters in the ergodic stationary state, as well as the
phase diagrams of batch MGs with correlated strategies.
3.2 Persistent order parameters in the ergodic
stationary state
In order to analyse the ergodic state in the regime of large
α we will make the following assumptions: (i) the sys-
tem becomes stationary in the long-time limit, i.e. we will
assume temporal translation invariance, limt→∞ Ct+τ,t =
C(τ) and limt→∞Gt+τ,t = G(τ), (ii) the absence of anoma-
lous response, i.e. we will assume that the integrated re-
sponse χ = limt→∞
∑
τ≤tG(τ) remains finite and (iii)
weak long-term memory, i.e. limt→∞Gtt′ = 0 for all fi-
nite t′.
The integrated response χ along with the persistent
part of the correlation function, c = limt→∞ t−1
∑
τ≤t C(τ),
will be the order parameters characterising the ergodic
stationary states of the game. The further analysis hence
proceeds by formulating closed equations for these persis-
tent order parameters.
Following [6] we introduce the re-scaled quantity q˜ρ(t) =
qρ(t)/t, and find from (13)
q˜ρ(t) =
1
t
qρ(0)− 1− ρ
1− ρ
α
t
∑
t′<t
∑
t′′
(1I +G)−1t′t′′sρ(t
′′)
10−1 100 101
α
100
101
σ
2
ρ=0.1
10−1 100 101
α
100
101
σ
2
ρ=0.3
10−1 100 101
α
10−1
100
101
σ
2
ρ=0.7
10−1 100 101
α
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
σ
2
ρ=0.9
Fig. 1. Volatility as a function of α for different values of ρ
for the batch game (ρi = ρ ∀i). Open symbols are from simu-
lations of the batch process with N = 1000 agents, averaged
over 10 samples of the disorder, and run for 500 batch time
steps. Filled markers are results from a direct iteration of the
single-particle problem using the method of [25] (5 × 104 re-
alisations of the single-agent process are generated, and the
iteration is performed for 100 time steps). Circles: tabula rasa
start (qi(0) = 0), squares: biased starts (|qi(0)| = 1). Solid
lines are the approximation of (34) for the ergodic phase and
are continued as dashed lines into the non-ergodic phase (where
the ergodic theory is longer valid).
+θρ +
√
α
t
√
1− ρ
1− ρ¯
∑
t′<t
ηρ(t
′) (18)
Here, we have assumed that θρ(t) = θρ for all t, so that
θρ is a static perturbation. Now, upon taking the limit
t→∞ and writing q˜ρ = limt→∞ q˜ρ(t), we find
q˜ρ = −α1− ρ
1− ρ
sρ
1 + χ
+ θρ +
√
α
1− ρ
1− ρηρ, (19)
where sρ = limt→∞ t−1
∑
τ≤t sgn[qρ(τ)] and
ηρ = limt→∞ t−1
∑
τ≤t ηρ(τ). Note that q˜ρ, sρ and ηρ are
random variables, coupled through Eq. (19) with each re-
alization corresponding to a realization of the single agent
process (13). The variance of the zero-average Gaussian
variable ηρ can be obtained from (14) and reads〈
η2ρ
〉
ηρ
= lim
τ,τ ′→∞
1
ττ ′
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′≤τ ′
[(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt′
=
ρ
1−ρ + c
(1 + χ)2
. (20)
The analysis now proceeds along the lines of [6], and we
distinguish between so-called ‘frozen’ and ‘fickle’ agents.
The distinction between frozen and fickle agents was first
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introduced in [26] and is based on observations from nu-
merical simulations of batch and on-line MGs. One finds
that some of the trajectories qi(t) of the original dynamics
grow linearly in time in the stationary state, qi(t) ∼ t, so
that the corresponding (frozen) agent always employs the
same strategy. Other (fickle) agents keep switching strate-
gies, and their score difference remains finite. While the
distinction between frozen and fickle agents was originally
made on the level of the initial N -particle dynamics, the
same type of trajectories are also found in the realizations
of the effective single particle process (generated for ex-
ample using the method of [25]). Frozen effective agents
can be identified as those realizations of (13) for which
q˜ρ 6= 0. One then has sρ = sgn[q˜ρ]. Using Eq. (19) (set-
ting θρ = 0) this is seen to be the case if |ηρ| > γρ, where
γρ =
√
α(1−ρ)
1−ρ
1
1+χ . On the other hand, a given realiza-
tion of the representative agent process is ‘fickle’ when
the score-difference qρ(t) fluctuates around a finite value,
with occasional zero-crossings, then one has q˜ρ = 0. This
is the case if |ηρ| < γρ, and then sρ = ηρ/γρ. Note in par-
ticular that for fickle (effective) agents sρ is a continuous
variable, −1 < sρ < 1, with a non-zero value indicating
that the corresponding effective agent employs his or her
strategies with different frequencies.
From this the fraction of frozen agents with strategy
correlation ρ can be computed4 by performing the Gaus-
sian integral over ηρ (with variance given by (20)):
φ(ρ) = 〈θ(|ηρ| − γρ)|ρ〉ηρ
= 1− erf
(
λ(ρ)√
2
)
, (21)
where we have introduced
λ(ρ) =
√
α(1 − ρ)
ρ+ (1 − ρ)c . (22)
θ in (21) is the step function; θ(x) = 1 if x > 0, and
θ(x) = 0 otherwise. The corresponding persistent part of
the correlation function reads
c(ρ) ≡ lim
t→∞
t−1
∑
τ≤t
Cρ(τ)
=
〈
s2ρ
〉
ηρ
= 〈θ(|ηρ| − γ)〉ηρ +
〈
(ηρ/γρ)
2θ(γρ − |ηρ|)
〉
ηρ
= φ(ρ) +
1− φ(ρ)
λ(ρ)2
− 1
λ(ρ)
√
2
π
exp
(−λ(ρ)2/2) .(23)
Applying a static perturbation θρ in (19) is (up to a prefac-
tor
√
α(1 − ρ)/(1− ρ)) identical to perturbing the static
random variable ηρ. Such perturbations applied in the
stationary state affect only fickle agents, for which we
have sρ = ηρ/γρ. The susceptibility χ(ρ) ≡
∑
τ Gρ(τ) =
4 φ(ρ) is the probability for an agent with strategy correla-
tion ρ to be frozen.
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Fig. 2. Persistent part c of the correlation function for the
batch game with ρi = ρ for all i and with tabula rasa initial
conditions. Connected symbols are data obtained from simula-
tions for N = 300 players, measured over 500 batch steps, pre-
ceded by an equilibration period of 500 steps. The curves are
ρ = 0.9, 0.8, . . . , 0 from top to bottom. The solid lines are the
theoretical predictions for the ergodic regime and have been
continued as dashed lines by extrapolation of equations (27,
28) into the non-ergodic phase below αc, where they are no
longer valid. The slight discrepancy between the theoretical
lines and the numerical data close to the predicted breakdown
of the ergodic theory is due to finite-size effects.
∂
∂θρ
〈sρ〉ηρ may therefore be written as
χ(ρ) =
√
(1− ρ)
α(1 − ρ)
〈
∂sρ
∂ηρ
〉
ηρ
= γ−1ρ
√
(1− ρ)
α(1− ρ) (1− φ(ρ)) . (24)
From these equations the overall persistent correlation c
and susceptibility χ can be computed self-consistently as
c =
∫
dρP (ρ)
1− ρ
1− ρc(ρ), (25)
χ =
∫
dρP (ρ)
1− ρ
1− ρχ(ρ). (26)
To this end, note that inserting (21) and (22) into (23)
allows one to express c(ρ) in terms of c (and the model
parameters α and ρ).
4 Unimodal distribution of strategy
correlations
We will now first investigate the case of a unimodal dis-
tribution of strategy correlations, P (ρ′) = δ(ρ − ρ′), i.e.
the case where all ρi are equal, ρi ≡ ρ, with 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
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4.1 Stationary state in the ergodic regime and phase
diagram
In this case the above self-consistent set of equations (25,
26) for the order parameters c and χ can be compactified
considerably using equations (22, 23, 24) and we find (with
c = c(ρ), φ = φ(ρ), χ = χ(ρ) and λ = λ(ρ)):
c = 1−
(
1− 1
λ2
)
erf
(
λ√
2
)
− 1
λ
√
2
π
e−λ
2/2, (27)
χ−1 =
α
erf
(
λ√
2
) − 1, (28)
where
λ =
√
α(
ρ
1−ρ + c
) . (29)
Note that ρ = ρ in the case of unimodal P (ρ′) = δ(ρ−ρ′).
The fraction of frozen agents is given by φ = 1−erf(λ/√2).
Eqs. (27)-(28) agree with the corresponding equations for
the static order parameters obtained within a replica sym-
metric theory [2]. They are easily solved numerically, and
exact analytical predictions for c, φ and χ as functions of
α can be obtained for 0 ≤ ρ < 1. Results for the persis-
tent correlation c are shown in Fig. 2, and we find very
good agreement with numerical simulations for large α,
greater than critical values αc(ρ). The deviations at lower
values of α = P/N < αc(ρ) are due to a breakdown of
the ergodic theory, more precisely of the assumption of
finite integrated response [6]. The point αc(ρ) at which
this happens can be computed from Eq. (28). One finds
that χ → ∞ at a critical value of α = αc(ρ) given by
αc(ρ) = erf(λc/
√
2), where λc = λc(ρ) fulfills
erf
(
λc(ρ)√
2
)
= 1 +
ρ
1− ρ −
√
2
π
1
λc(ρ)
e−λc(ρ)
2/2. (30)
Solving this equation numerically leads to the phase dia-
gram depicted in Fig. 3, with the critical line in the (α, ρ)
plane separating the ergodic phase (χ finite) and the non-
ergodic phase. This phase diagram for the MG with diver-
sified strategies was first obtained from the corresponding
replica calculation in [2]. While macroscopic observables
such as the volatility are sensitive to the initial conditions
in the non-ergodic phase, α < αc(ρ), the starting point is
irrelevant in the ergodic phase, α > αc(ρ). We display the
volatility for so-called tabula rasa starts (qi(0) = 0 for all
i), and for randomly biased starts (|qi(0)| = q0 = O(1))
in Fig. 1.
4.2 Analytic approximations for the volatility
As we have seen it is possible to compute macroscopic or-
der parameters of the stationary state, such as the fraction
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
ergodic
non−ergodic
Fig. 3. Phase diagram for the batch minority game with uni-
modal distribution of strategy correlations, P (ρ′) = δ(ρ′ − ρ).
of frozen agents or the persistent part of the correlation
function, exactly and in good agreement with simulations
in the ergodic regime for general values of ρ. We will now
turn to the magnitude of the market fluctuations σ2. By
performing a direct average in the generating functional,
it was shown in [6] that the disorder-averaged volatility
matrix Ξ is proportional to the correlator of the single-
particle noise in the effective agent process. Generalizing
the results of [6] to arbitrary values of ρ we find the fol-
lowing exact result:
Ξtt′ = (1− ρ)Λtt′ = (1− ρ)
[
(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1
]
tt′
.
(31)
Thus, an exact calculation of the volatility requires the
computation of this matrix convolution, and hence the
knowledge of both the long-term and transient behaviours
of the dynamical order parameters G(τ) and C(τ) in the
stationary state. To this end a full computation of the
time-translation invariant solutions of the self-consistent
representative agent problem would be necessary. Due to
the retarded self-interaction and the presence of the coloured
single-particle noise, this is in general impossible. One
therefore has to resort to approximations, and the gen-
erally accepted approach first presented in [6] aims at ex-
pressing the market volatility in terms of the persistent
order parameters c, φ and χ.
To this end one separates the contribution of the frozen
agents to the correlation function C from the contribution
of the fickle agents and writes
C(t− t′) = φ+ (1− φ) 〈sρ(t)sρ(t′)〉fi , (32)
where the average 〈. . .〉fi extends only over fickle agents.
Inserting this into (31) and recalling
σ2 = limT→∞ T−1
∑
t≤T Ξtt leads to
1
1− ρσ
2 =
ρ
1−ρ + φ
(1 + χ)2
+ (1− φ)
× lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
t≤τ
〈∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)−1tt′ sρ(t
′)
2〉
fi
.(33)
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In [6], for ρ = 1/2, the authors proceeded by keeping only
the instantaneous contribution, t = t′, in the last term.
Generalizing their calculation to arbitrary 0 ≤ ρ < 1 one
obtains the following approximate expression
σ2 = (1− ρ)
[
ρ/(1− ρ) + φ
(1 + χ)2
+ (1− φ)
]
. (34)
Fig. 1 demonstrates that this approximation is in good
agreement with data from simulations of the original batch
process for ρ & 1/2, but that it becomes less accurate as
ρ is reduced. In particular we note that in simulations we
find volatilities σ2 > 1 in the ergodic phase of batch games
with largely anti-correlated strategies, i.e. low values of ρ,
while (34) predicts a volatility below the random trad-
ing limit σ2 = 1 for all values of ρ and α ≥ αc(ρ). We
have verified explicitly that the discrepancy between this
analytical approximation and the numerically measured
volatility can be traced back to the omission of the non-
instantaneous terms in (33): iterating the single-particle
process using the Eissfeller-Opper algorithm [25], measur-
ing the contributions from the frozen and fickle agents,
respectively, and taking into account all terms of (33) re-
stores the agreement with direct numerical simulations of
the batch process. The discrepancy between the approx-
imation of Eq. (34) and the volatility measured in simu-
lations becomes extremal in the fully anti-correlated case.
In this case one finds no frozen agents, and inserting ρ = 0
and φ = 0 into (34) gives σ2 = 1 for α > αc(ρ = 0) = 1.
In numerical simulations of the batch process, however,
we find a decreasing relation σ2 = σ2(α), and σ2 = 1 is
only approached in the limit α → ∞, see Fig. 4. In the
next section, we will study the case of fully anti-correlated
strategies in more detail, and will derive different analyt-
ical approximations for the global market fluctuations in
this case.
4.3 The fully anti-correlated case
In the special case of completely anti-correlated strategies,
ρ = 0, and tabula rasa starts, we observe experimentally
that the system is always in a fully oscillating phase, i.e.
that all agents switch strategies at each time step, and that
accordingly C(τ) = (−1)τ for all τ . Eq. (27) for ρ = 0 is
indeed solved by c = 0 so that no frozen agents are possi-
ble. We will use this observation as an ansatz, which will
allow us to proceed analytically and to give an approxi-
mate expression for the volatility, which is different from
the one (derived for general ρ) in the previous section.
Its derivation is similar to the analysis of the non-ergodic
state in the limit α → 0 of the standard batch MG [6].
In this limit of the game with uncorrelated strategies a
similar oscillatory state is found.
For ρ = 0, we have D(τ) = C(τ) = (−1)τ and us-
ing Eq. (31), we conclude that the correlation matrix of
the single-particle noise in the stationary state is given
by Λtt′ = (−1)t−t′Υ 2, where Υ =
∑
τ (−1)τ (1I +G)−1(τ).
Thus, for any fixed realization of the single-particle noise
η0(t) must be of the form η0(t) = Υz(−1)t, where z is
10−1 100 101
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100
101
σ
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2
Fig. 4. Volatility as a function of α for ρ = 0 for the
batch game. Connected symbols are from simulations started
from different initial conditions (circles are tabula rasa starts,
|qi(0)| = 0, squares are |qi(0)| = 2.0 and diamonds |qi(0)| =
10.0). The solid and dashed lines are the approximations
of Eqs. (41) and (42) respectively. The vertical dot-dashed
line marks the analytically predicted location of the phase
transition at αc(ρ = 0) = 1. Inset: σ
2 vs α for ρ =
0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 from top to bottom (tabula rasa
starts).
a (static) Gaussian random variable of zero mean and
unit variance (note that the subscript in η0(t) indicates
that we are concerned with the case ρ = 0 in this sec-
tion, similarly for q0(t) and s˜0 below). A given stochastic
value of z determines the oscillation amplitude and sign
of the corresponding trajectory of the noise η0(t). The
volatility in this fully oscillatory state can be obtained as
σ2 = limT→∞ T−1
∑
t≤T Λtt = Υ
2, so that it remains to
compute Υ . Upon introduction of
s˜0 ≡ lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
t≤τ
(−1)tsgn[q0(t)] (35)
we can use the identity
√
α
∑
t′′
〈η0(t)η0(t′′)〉η0 Gt′t′′ = 〈sgn[q0(t′)]η0(t)〉η0 (36)
(obtained by an integration by parts in the generating
functional [6]) to write Υ as
Υ = 1− 1√
α
〈s˜0z〉z , (37)
where 〈. . .〉z denotes an average over the standard Gaus-
sian variable z. We have also used the fact that
∑
τ (−1)τ (1I+
G)−1(τ) = [1 +
∑
τ (−1)τG(τ)]−1 here [6].
In order to compute the average 〈s˜0z〉z, we note that
from the effective single-agent process we can derive the
relation
∆˜q0 = −αΥ s˜0 +
√
αη˜0 (38)
between the staggered averages s˜0 and
∆˜q0 = lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
t≤τ
(−1)t(q0(t+ 1)− q0(t)), (39)
η˜0 = lim
τ→∞
τ−1
∑
t≤τ
(−1)tη0(t). (40)
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Fig. 5. Amplitude of oscillations of the correlation function as
a function of α for the batch game for ρ = 1/2 (filled markers)
and ρ = 0 (open markers). Results are from simulations with
N = 500 agents, run for 500 batch steps and averaged over
10 realisations of the disorder. In the simulations we measure
c1 in the stationary state as c1 = (2T )
−1
∑
2T
τ=T
|C(τ + 1) −
C(τ )|, where T = 125 batch steps. Circles are data for tabula
rasa starts, squares from simulations with biased starts (q0 =
0.5). The vertical dashed lines mark the locations of the phase
transition of the games with uncorrelated strategies at αc(ρ =
1/2) ≈ 0.3374 and at αc(ρ = 0) = 1 for fully anticorrelated
strategies.
Since the effective agents are purely oscillatory, one has
sgn(∆˜q0) = −s˜0. Using Eq. (38) and the relation η0(t) =
Υz(−1)t we therefore require sgn[z] = −s˜0, i.e. s˜0z = −|z|
for any given realization of z with
√
αΥ |z| > αΥ (and the
corresponding realization of the effective agent process).
Since Υ comes out positive this is the case for realiza-
tions with |z| > √α. For |z| < √α both signs s˜0z = ±|z|
are possible; using the Eissfeller-Opper algorithm we have
checked that indeed both signs are taken in this case. A
similar complication has been encountered in the context
of mixed Minority/Majority Games in [12].
We have two possibilities to proceed: firstly, we can
assume that s˜0z = −|z| also for −
√
α < z <
√
α, and
that deviations from this behaviour will only have a small
effect on the volatility. We then end up with the following
approximation
σ2 ≈
(
1 +
1√
α
〈|z|〉z
)2
=
(
1 +
√
2
πα
)2
. (41)
Alternatively, we can assume that both signs s˜0z = ±|z|
are taken equally often for |z| < √α so that this interval
does not contribute to the average 〈s˜oz〉z. We then find
σ2 ≈
(
1 +
√
2
πα
e−α/2
)2
. (42)
As depicted in the main panel of Fig. 4 the approximations
of (41) and (42) appear to form upper and lower bounds of
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Fig. 6. Persistent part c of the correlation function for the
on-line game with ρi = ρ for all i and with tabula rasa initial
conditions. Connected symbols are data obtained from simula-
tions for N = 300 players, measured over 25000 on-line steps,
preceded by an equilibration period of 25000 steps. The curves
are ρ = 0.9, 0.8, . . . , 0 from top to bottom. The solid lines are
the theoretical predictions for the ergodic regime and have been
continued as dashed lines by extrapolation into the non-ergodic
phase below αc, where they are no longer valid. The slight dis-
crepancy between the theoretical lines and the numerical data
close to the predicted breakdown of the ergodic theory is due
to finite-size effects.
the volatility, respectively. Both approximations become
exact only in the limit α→ 0, but reproduce the behaviour
of σ2 = σ2(α) quite well, even for larger values of α ≈ 1.
We conclude this section by mentioning that the batch
MG with fully anti-correlated strategies, ρ = 0, is differ-
ent from the cases 0 < ρ < 1 in two respects: (i) the
fully anti-correlated case exhibits oscillatory behaviour,
C(τ) = (−1)τ , for all α, even above αc(ρ = 0) = 1,
whereas in all other cases oscillations decay above αc and
persist only in the non-ergodic phase, where one finds cor-
relation functions of the form C(τ) = c0 + c1(−1)τ for
τ > 05. This is illustrated in Fig. 5, where we plot c1 as
a function of α for different values of ρ; (ii) the volatility
plotted as a function of α exhibits a minimum at αc(ρ)
for all 0 < ρ < 1, but is decreasing monotonically for
ρ = 0, see the inset of Fig. 4. Nevertheless the station-
ary volatility in the fully anti-correlated case does depend
on initial conditions below αc(ρ = 0) = 1, whereas the
starting point is irrelevant for α > 1.
4.4 Comparison with the on-line game
We will now turn to the case of on-line learning rules, and
will discuss the influence of the timing of adaptation of the
agents on the behaviour of MGs with correlated strategies.
5 Below αc we find C(τ ) = c0+ c1(−1)
τ for τ > 0 within the
experimental accuracy and with positive fitting parameters c0
and c1. We observe that c0 + c1 < 1 unless the case ρ = 0
or the limit α → 0 is considered. Trivially one always has
C(τ = 0) = 1.
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Fig. 7. Volatility as a function of α for different values of ρ
for the on-line game (ρi = ρ for all agents). Solid lines are the
approximation of (44) for the ergodic phase and are continued
as dashed lines into the non-ergodic phase (where the ergodic
theory is no longer valid). Markers are from simulations of the
on-line process with N = 300 agents (N = 1000 for ρ = 0.9),
averaged over 10 samples of the disorder, and run for 105 on-
line time steps. Circles: tabula rasa start (qi(0) = 0), squares:
biased starts (|qi(0)| = 3).
A generating functional theory for the on-line game
with random external information and uncorrelated strate-
gies has been worked out in [21]. The analysis has to deal
with the explicit dependence on the external information,
and inevitably requires a much more elaborate mathemat-
ical formalism than the analysis of the batch game. The
resulting theory is easily adapted to the case of general
strategy assignments with arbitrary correlations. We will
not report the mathematical details of the calculation, but
will only state that, in the ergodic regime, it leads to self-
consistent equations for the persistent order parameters
(such as c, φ and χ), which are identical to the ones of the
batch MG with general strategy correlations. As a conse-
quence, the location of the phase transition (marked by
an onset of diverging integrated response) is identical in
batch and on-line games with the same distribution P (ρ)
of correlation parameters. Results for the persistent corre-
lation c as a function of α are compared with simulations
of the on-line game with unimodular strategy correlations
in Fig. 6. The on-line simulations shown in Fig. 6 essen-
tially also match those of the batch case shown in Fig. 2
for the ergodic region.
Numerical simulations, however, reveal crucial differ-
ences between the volatilities of the on-line and batch
games with correlated strategies. A comparison of Figs.
1 and 7 shows that in their ergodic states the volatility
of batch games can take values both above and below the
random trading limit σ2 = 1 , whereas that in on-line
games never exceeds σ2 = 1. The difference between the
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Fig. 8. Volatility as a function of α for the on-line game at
ρ = 0, and for different values of the initial bias |qi(0)|. All
data is from simulations with N = 300 agents averaged over
10 samples of the disorder.
volatilites of batch and on-line games becomes maximally
pronounced in the fully anti-correlated case, compare Figs.
4 and 8. In the on-line game with ρ = 0 we find that the
volatility is equal to one for all α > αc(ρ = 0) = 1, whereas
it approaches this random trading limit only asymptoti-
cally for α → ∞ in the batch case. Allowing the agents
to switch stategies only every M time steps according to
the update rule (2) one can interpolate between the batch
and on-line cases6: Fig. 9 shows the volatility σ2 as a func-
tion of α for the fully anti-correlated case for different in-
termediate choices of M . While small values of M ≪ P
produce market fluctuations close to those of the on-line
game (which corresponds to M = 1), the batch limit is
obtained for M ≥ O(P ).
Similarly to the batch case, a computation of the tran-
sient parts of the dynamical order parameters would be
necessary to obtain exact expressions for the volatility
of on-line MGs. As this is in general not feasible, one
proceeds as in the batch case, and tries to find approx-
imate expressions in terms of the persistent order param-
eters only. Such an approach was first proposed for on-line
games in [21], and is slightly different from the approxima-
tions in the batch case. The approximation is based on the
observation that in mean-field disordered systems with de-
tailed balance fluctuation-dissipation relations can be used
to ‘transform away’ non-persistent parts of the response
and correlation functions without changing averages of
single-time observables and averages of two-time quanti-
ties at infinite time-separations. For equilibrium systems
with detailed balance this approach is exact [27]. It can be
used to extract the static order parameters as obtained in
a replica-symmetric equilibrium approach from the gener-
ating functional equations. Details of this procedure can
be found in [27,28].
Although the MG does not exhibit detailed balance a
similar ad-hoc procedure for removing the non-persistent
parts of the order parameters has been successfully em-
6 Note also that some work on mixed populations of agents
with individual updating frequencies Mi is currently being fi-
nalised by other authors [29].
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Fig. 9. Volatility of a MG with fully anti-correlated strategies
(ρi = 0 for all i) and in which switching of strategies is allowed
only everyM time steps. The individual curves are for different
values of M . All data is from simulations performed at a con-
stant number P = αN = 50 of possible states of the external
information µ and were run for 106 on-line steps. Results are
averages over 20 realisations of the disorder. The corresponding
curves for the on-line and batch games are displayed as filled
symbols for comparison. The lines connecting the markers are
guides to the eye.
ployed to obtain approximations for the volatility in [21].
It amounts to assuming that C and G are of the following
form:
Ctt′ = c+(1−c)δtt′, Gtt′ = χδ(1−δ)t−t
′−1 (for t > t′),
(43)
with the limit δ → 0 to be taken at the end of the calcu-
lation. In this way one preserves
limτ→∞ C(τ) = c and
∑
τ G(τ) = χ, but removes non-
persistent contributions.
This approach is easily generalised to the case of uni-
modular distributions of the correlation parameter, and
upon making the standard assumptions on time-translation
invariance and ergodicity, one obtains the following ap-
proximate expression for the volatility
σ2 = (1− ρ)
[
ρ/(1− ρ) + c
(1 + χ)2
+ (1− c)
]
, (44)
which differs only slightly from the approximate result for
the batch game, Eq. (34). As shown in Fig. 7 this approx-
imation is accurate in the ergodic phase for all values of ρ,
even in a regime where the corresponding approximation
for the batch MG is not satisfactory to describe the volatil-
ity measured in numerical experiments. We attribute the
deviations slightly above the transition to finite-size ef-
fects. Applying the same method to the volatility of the
batch game also leads to Eq. (44) and hence to the same
qualitative and quantative discrepancy between the nu-
merically measured and analytically estimated volatilities
in batch games with largely anti-correlated strategies. See
also [20] for alternative derivations of Eq. (44) for batch
and on-line games with uncorrelated strategies.
Eq. (44) agrees with the approximation for the volatil-
ity derived from the replica analysis of the MG with di-
versified strategies [2]. We note that the analogue of the
removal of the non-persistent parts of C and G in the
dynamical approach is reflected by an assumption on the
cross-correlations between the agents in the replica for-
malism of [2]. Based on the assumption that 〈sisj〉 =
〈si〉 〈sj〉 for i 6= j the authors of [2] neglect a term ∆ ≡
N−1
∑
i6=j
∑
µ ξ
µ
i ξ
µ
j (〈sisj〉−〈si〉 〈sj〉), in the ergodic phase
(α > αc). Here again si(t) = sgn[qi(t)], and 〈. . .〉 denotes
an average over time. While our findings concerning the
volatility suggest that this assumption is appropriate in
the on-line game, it appears to be inaccurate in the batch
game at low values of ρ. We have confirmed this numeri-
cally in simulations of the batch MG. At fixed α > 1 we
find that ∆ = ∆(α, ρ) is close to zero for large values of
ρ ≃ 1, but increases as ρ approaches zero. While we do
not depict these results here, we will only point out that
for ρ = 0 we find oscillatory behaviour, si(t) = si(0)(−1)t,
at all α, so that 〈si〉 = 0, but 〈sisj〉 = ±1. One then has
〈sisj〉 − 〈si〉 〈sj〉 = ±1 6= 0 so that the above approxima-
tion fails.
To conclude the discussion of the volatility in on-line
models, we would like to mention that the volatility of
MGs with real histories and fully anti-correlated strategies
behaves qualitatively like the one of the on-line MG with
random history, with σ2 = 1 for α > 1 [30].
Finally, in this section, let us briefly address the role
of global oscillations in on-line MGs. As an analytical
treatment of this dynamical feature would require a so-
lution of the transient behaviour of the dynamical order
parameters (which is still awaited) the results in the re-
mainder of this section and in section 4.5 are all based
on direct numerical simulations of the games under con-
sideration. Anti-persistent behaviour in the on-line MG
with uncorrelated strategies and with real market histories
was identified first in [26], where the authors find oscilla-
tory behaviour below αc, but no persistent oscillations in
the high-α phase, in qualitative agreement with results for
batch games [6], recall also Fig. 5. In [26] the authors con-
sidered an on-line version of the MG in which the agents
use only the sign of the total bid to update their strategy
scores, i.e. a model, in which A(ℓ′) in Eq. (1) is replaced
by π(ℓ′) = sgn[A(ℓ′)]. We will refer to this as the ‘sign-
update’ rule, as opposed to the linear relation (1). The
authors then consider a conditional correlation function
Cππ(τ) = P
−1
P∑
µ=1
〈π(ℓ)π(ℓ + τ)|µ〉 (45)
in the stationary state, where the average 〈π(ℓ)π(ℓ + τ)|µ〉
extends only over times ℓ and ℓ + τ for which µ(ℓ) =
µ(ℓ+ τ) = µ. Similarly we can define a conditional ‘spin-
spin’ correlation function according to
Css(τ) = (NP )
−1
P∑
µ=1
N∑
i=1
〈si(ℓ)si(ℓ + τ)|µ〉 . (46)
Fig. 10 demonstrates that the games both with un-
correlated strategies (ρ = 1/2), and with anti-correlated
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Fig. 10. Correlation functions for the on-line game with real
market histories. All data are from simulations at P = αN =
128, run for 105 on-line time steps. Left column: ρ = 0.5, the
oscillatory curves are at α = 0.1, below the transition, non-
oscillatory curves at α = 1.25, above the transition. Right col-
umn: ρ = 0.0, oscillatory curves α = 0.1, non-oscillatory curves
α = 1.58. The upper two panels show the ‘spin-spin’ correlation
function, Css(τ ), conditional on the information pattern, the
lower two panels the conditional correlation function, Cpipi(τ ),
of the sign of the total bid π(ℓ) = sgn[A(ℓ)] (see text for fur-
ther explanantions). Averages over 10 to 100 realisations of
the disorder are taken. Results for Cpipi at ρ = 0 are displayed
as running averages over 64 points to smoothen the noisy raw
data.
strategies (ρ = 0), respectively, show anti-persistence in
their non-ergodic states, α < αc(ρ), but not above αc:
Cππ and Css exhibit oscillations of period 2P below αc,
but approach a constant value above the transition. In
particular the behaviour of the on-line game with anti-
correlated strategies appears crucially different from its
batch counterpart in this respect: in the batch game with
anti-correlated strategies we find oscillatory behaviour for
all values of α, whereas in the on-line case with real his-
tories and sign-updates, they are found only in the low-α
phase.
Before turning to the next section, we would like to
remark that the oscillations below αc, first reported in [26],
are generally not detected very easily in on-line games:
we have tested several other variations of the model and
observables and found that no oscillatory behaviour can be
observed if (i) the linear update (1) is used instead of the
sign-update prescription, (ii) if unconditional correlation
functions are considered instead of conditional ones or if
(iii) real market histories are replaced by fake histories.
While no persistent oscillations are found in uncondi-
tional correlation functions of on-line games with random
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Fig. 11. Amplitude of oscillations of the (unconditional) spin-
spin correlation function of the on-line game with adaptation
allowed only everyM time steps. Oscillations are of period 2M .
All data is from simulations, the lines connecting the markers
are guides to the eye. Solid symbols: ρ = 1/2 (squares M =
10P , diamonds M = 25P , circles are the data for the batch
limit, plotted for comparison, see also Fig. 5). Open symbols:
ρ = 0 (diamonds M = 25P , right triangles M = 100P , left
triangles M = 1000P , circles are the data for the batch limit).
All simulations are performed at P = 50 and run for 106 on-
line steps, averages over 20 realisations of the disorder are taken
[32]. Stars are the data for randomized updating (ρ = 0, M =
10P , see Fig. 12 for simulation details). No oscillations are
found in this case.
histories, oscillations emerge gradually for α < αc(ρ =
0.5) in the case of uncorrelated strategies, and for all α in
the anti-correlated case, as the time lag M between two
successive strategy updates is increased to approach the
batch limit, see Fig. 11 (oscillation amplitude for on-line
games is not shown, but is indistinguishable from zero on
the scale of Fig. 11).
4.5 Random timing of adaptation
Finally we have performed numerical simulations on MGs
with asynchronous, random timing of adaptation. Choos-
ing M ≥ O(P ) and allowing all agents independently and
randomly with probability 1/M to update their strategy
preferences at a given on-line step, while still updating
their score difference at each step, generates a batch-like
model with asynchronous updating. As depicted in Fig.
11 the randomization of the updates removes the oscilla-
tions in the spin-spin correlation functions of the batch
game. The corresponding volatilities are virtually identi-
cal to those of the corresponding on-line games above αc,
in particular we find σ2 = 1 for α > 1 in the game with
random updating and full anti-correlation, see Fig. 12. In
the non-ergodic phase the effect of the stochastic updating
is a gradual reduction of the volatility.
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5 Mixed population of speculators and
producers
The theory of section 3 allows one in principle to study the
batch MG for an arbitray distribution P (ρ) of correlation
parameters. While the previous section dealt only with
the case of unimodular distributions, we will now use the
above formalism to study a mixed population of ‘specula-
tors’ and ‘producers’ [2]. While a speculator is defined as
a normal agent (holding two strategies), a producer is an
agent with limited choice and has only one single strategy
at his or her disposal (or equivalently two identical strate-
gies, corresponding to full correlation, ρ = 1). A detailed
analysis of the statics of games with such mixed popula-
tions is contained in [2]. In this final section before our
conclusions we will complement this work by a study of
the dynamics of such models, and will demonstrate that
the dynamical theory reproduces the results of the static
replica analysis. The interplay of producers and specula-
tors is also discussed in a different context in [31], where
so-called grand-canonical MGs are considered7; see also
[20] for further details.
We will consider an ensemble of N agents, consisting of
(1− x)N speculators (with correlation 0 ≤ ρ < 1 between
their strategies) and xN producers, where 0 ≤ x < 1. This
corresponds to a choice
P (ρ′) = (1− x)δ(ρ′ − ρ) + xδ(ρ′ − 1) (47)
in the above generating functional calculation. As before,
the parameter α = P/N is defined as the ratio between
the number of patterns and the total number of agents.
Using Eqs. (25) and (26) we find
c =
1− ρ
1− ρ (1 − x)c(ρ) (48)
χ =
1− ρ
1− ρ (1 − x)χ(ρ), (49)
where ρ = (1 − x)ρ + x. c and χ are then determined
self-consistently using expressions (23) and (24) for c(ρ)
and χ(ρ). We have checked and confirmed these analytical
results for c against simulations for some choices of the
model parameters, but do not report the numerical data
here. After some more algebra we find
χ =
(
α/(1− x)
erf
(
λ/
√
2
) − 1)−1 , (50)
where λ is fixed as the root of the equation√
2
π
e−λ
2/2
λ
+
(
1− 1
λ2
)
erf
(
λ√
2
)
+
α/(1 − x)
λ2
=
1
(1− ρ)(1 − x) . (51)
7 In the grand-canonical games studied in [31] speculators
are agents who hold only one strategy (as opposed to two in
the present paper), but in addition they have the option not
to play at a given time step. Producers are agents with one
strategy, but who play at every time step.
From this we locate the onset of diverging integrated
response as
αc = (1− x)erf
(
λc√
2
)
, (52)
where λc solves√
2
π
e−λ
2
c/2
λc
+ erf
(
λc√
2
)
=
1
(1− ρ)(1 − x) . (53)
Note that αc/(1 − x), depends only on the combination
(1− ρ)(1− x). The resulting phase diagram is depicted in
Fig. 13. The above equations obtained from the generating
functional analysis agree with the corresponding results
from the replica calculation, as presented in [2]8.
Finally the generating functional approach allows one
to study the influence of decision noise on the phase dia-
gram and behaviour of MGs [16]. A corresponding calcu-
lation for mixed populations of producers and speculators
shows that multiplicative noise generally reduces the value
of αc/(1 − x), i.e. that the range of the ergodic phase is
increased when the trading decisions of the producers are
made stochastically to a certain degree [34]. This shift of
αc/(1 − x) becomes more pronounced as the noise level
is increased. A similar effect was previously also observed
in MGs in which the agents trade on different time scales
[13].
6 Concluding remarks
We have presented an analysis of the dynamics of minority
games with diversified strategies. Generating functional
techniques can be used to turn the coupled dynamics of
N interacting agents with heterogeneous strategy corre-
lations into an effective single-particle problem. The gen-
eral case of heterogeneous correlation parameters ρi of the
population of agents (drawn from a distribution P (ρ)) is
reflected in the fact that one finds an ensemble of single
agent processes as the final outcome of the theory, as op-
posed to just one effective single-agent process for the case
of uniform correlation parameter (ρi = ρ for all i).
In section 5 of this paper we have used the developed
formalism to study mixed populations of ‘speculators’ and
‘producers’. The dynamical approach leads to order pa-
rameter equations which are identical to those obtained
previously from replica analyses of such models, and ac-
cordingly the phase diagrams obtained from the statics
and dynamics coincide. In general one finds that adding
producers to the MG increases the range of the ergodic
phase of the game.
The main focus of our study, however, has been the fur-
ther analysis of the dynamical effective single-agent prob-
lem for the cases of batch and on-line games with unimodal
8 Note, however, that the conventions used in [2] are slightly
different, there an ensemble of N speculators and ρN producers
is considered (to make is (1 + ρ)N agents in total), and α is
defined as the ratio between the number of patterns P and the
number of speculators, α = P/N .
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Fig. 12. Volatility of the game with randomized, asynchronous
strategy updating (allow for strategy switches with probability
1/M at each on-line step, independently for different agents).
Upper panel: uncorrelated strategies (ρ = 1/2), lower panel:
anti-correlated strategies (ρ = 0). All data is from simulations
at P = 50, the top most curves (circles) are for M = 1 (corre-
sponding to the on-line game), squares M = 0.1P , diamonds
M = P , triangles M = 10P . Simulations are started from
tabula rasa initial conditions and run for 200M on-line steps
(2000M steps for M = 0.1P ), all data is averaged over at least
10 realisations of the disorder. The horizontal lines mark the
random trading limit, σ2 = 1, in both panels [33].
distributions of the strategy correlations, along with nu-
merical simulations and complementing the analysis of the
statics of such games previously presented in [2].
We find that the model with uniform, but general cor-
relation parameter ρ exhibits intriguing features, with sim-
ilarities, as well as crucial differences, compared to the
game with uncorrelated strategies (ρ = 1/2).
The main common features of the games with gen-
eral correlation parameter are (a) the existence of two
distinct phases in both the on-line and batch games for all
0 ≤ ρ < 1, with an ergodic state for α > αc(ρ), in which
no dependence on initial conditions is found, and a non-
ergodic phase below αc(ρ), in which the nature of the sta-
tionary state depends on the configuration from which the
dynamics is started; (b) persistent oscillations are present
in the non-ergodic phases of both the batch and the on-line
games for all ρ. Above αc(ρ), oscillations are absent in on-
line games with arbitrary correlation parameter 0 ≤ ρ < 1,
and in batch games as long as ρ > 0; (c) for 0 < ρ < 1
the transition point between the two phases is marked by
a minimum of the volatility σ2 = σ2(α) in both the batch
and on-line games; (d) we find analytically that the persis-
tent order parameters in the stationary ergodic state and
the phase diagram do not depend on the details of the
update rules (batch versus on-line learning) and that they
agree with those calculated within the replica symmetric
approximation; (e) no oscillations are found in simulations
of games with random asynchronous updating (for neither
uncorrelated nor anti-correlated strategies), while at the
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Fig. 13. Phase diagram of the batch MG with a mixed
population of speculators and producers. The line in the
(α/(1−x), 1/[(1−x)(1− ρ)])-plane is given by (52). The cross
marks the location of the phase transition in the standard game
(q = 0, ρ = 0.5).
same time a reduction of the volatility in the non-ergodic
phases of such games is observed.
However, the study of games with differently correla-
ted strategies and different timings of adaptation also re-
veals some new features and striking differences between
on-line and batch games, which up to now have not been
discussed systematically in the literature. These new is-
sues may be summarised as follows: (i) the dynamics of
the batch game with fully anti-correlated strategies, ρ = 0,
appears different from the batch games with 0 < ρ < 1
and from the on-line game with ρ = 0, as in the batch
game at ρ = 0 oscillations of the form C(τ) = (−1)τ are
found for all α and not only in the low-α phase; for tab-
ula rasa initial conditions the volatility σ2 of the batch
game is a smooth function of α without any minima or
turning points. Nevertheless we find that the game with
fully anti-correlated strategies is in a non-ergodic state
for α < αc(ρ = 0) = 1 for both batch and on-line learn-
ing rules, with the usual dependence of macroscopic order
parameters on initial conditions in this regime; (ii) the
volatilities in batch and on-line games deviate increasingly
from each other as the correlation parameter ρ is lowered;
by allowing the agents to update their strategy preferences
synchronously only once everyM steps it is possible to in-
terpolate smoothly between the on-line and batch limits,
M = 1 and M ≥ O(αN), respectively; (iii) the available
approximations for the volatilities of batch MGs, neglect-
ing the retarded self-interaction of fickle agents, become
unreliable in this regime of anti-correlated strategy assig-
ments. Thus, care has to be taken whenever these approxi-
mations are applied to other extensions of the conventional
batch MG. The corresponding approximations in the on-
line case, based on discarding transient contributions to
the response and correlation functions, however, appear
to be valid above αc(ρ) for all values of ρ, even in the case
of full anti-correlation.
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